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翻訳と辞書　辞書検索 [ 開発暫定版 ] スポンサード リンク Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction ： ウィキペディア英語版 Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction In auction theory, a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction is a type of sealed-bid auction of multiple items. Bidders submit bids that report their valuations for the items, without knowing the bids of the other people in the auction. The auction system assigns the items in a socially optimal manner: it charges each individual the harm they cause to other bidders. It also gives bidders an incentive to bid their true valuations, by ensuring that the optimal strategy for each bidder is to bid their true valuations of the items. It is a generalization of a Vickrey auction for multiple items. The auction is named after William Vickrey, Edward H. Clarke, and Theodore Groves for their papers that successively generalized the idea. == Formal description== ; Notation For any set of auctioned items $M\; =\; \backslash$ and any set of bidders $N\; =\; \backslash$, let $V^M\_N$ be the social value of the VCG auction for a given bid-combination. For a bidder $b\_i$ and item $t\_j$, let the bidder's bid for the item be $v\_(t\_)$. The notation $A\; \backslash setminus\; B$ means the set of elements of A which are not elements of B. ; Assignment A bidder $b\_i$ whose bid for an item $t\_j$, namely $v\_(t\_)$, is an "overbid" wins the item, but pays $V^\_\}\_$. When item $t\_j$ is available, they could attain welfare $V^\_$, however, so that the attainable welfare is now $V^\}$. The difference between the two levels of welfare is therefore the loss in attainable welfare suffered by the rest bidders, as predicted, given the winner $b\_i$ got the item $t\_j$. This quantity depends on the offers of the rest agents and is unknown to agent $b\_i$. ; Winner's utility ''The winning bidder whose bid is his true value $A$ for the item $t\_j$, $v\_(t\_)=A,$ derives maximum utility $A\; -\; \backslash left(V^\_\}\_\{N\; \backslash setminus\; \backslash \{b\_i\backslash \}\}\backslash right).$'' 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク 翻訳と辞書 : 翻訳のためのインターネットリソース Copyright(C) kotoba.ne.jp 1997-2016. All Rights Reserved.